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Abstract
We analyze a dynamic model in which Þrms and consumers choose to
adopt one of two technologies or delay their adoption. Adoption allows
agents to trade with other adopters of the same technology. We show
that there is an ineﬃcient equlibrium in which Þrms diﬀerentiate across
standards and consumers delay their adoption. With one standard, there
is immediate adoption, which matches the experience of the 56K modem
market.
JEL: L15, L10
1 Introduction
In early 1997, two groups of Þrms introduced 56K modems almost simultane-
ously. The modems were identical in the sense that they had the same per-
formance characteristics but incompatible in the sense that if a consumer had
a diﬀerent standard then the consumers Internet Service Provider (ISP), the
modem was reduced to 33K. Sales were very disappointing for both technolo-
gies and the two sides, believing the standards war was to blame, turned to
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to set a standard. The ITU
issued the V.90 standard in early 1998 and modem sales increased dramatically
immediately thereafter. Most previous theoretical models would predict that
tipping would occur fairly rapidly in competition between two identical stan-
∗I thank Martino De Stefano for helpful comments on this work, as well as excellent research
assistance. Support was provided by NSF Grant SES-0112527 and a grant from the NET
Institute.
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dards. However, that was not the case here. Instead, the market required an
intervention.1
This paper oﬀers a new explanation for why we see adoption delay. We show
that adoption failure can be the result of service provider incentives to diﬀer-
entiate across standards, even when consumers would prefer a uniÞed standard.
In the case of 56K, we claim that because ISPs diﬀerentiated across standards,
consumers delayed their adoption decision, and vice versa. However, eﬃciency
most likely called for early coordination on one standard or the other. In our
model, as was true in the 56K market, adoption is slow under two standards
but immediate under one standard.2
While our model is motivated by the 56K modem example, we believe that
the model highlights issues that may be important in many markets with net-
work eﬀects. We consider a model in which there are two technologies avail-
able. In each period, consumers and Þrms choose to adopt a technology or
wait until the next period. Consumers and Þrms that adopt the same technol-
ogy may trade with each other, which is the sole value of technology adoption.
The model exhibits indirect network eﬀects in the sense that consumers beneÞt
when other consumers choose their technology because more Þrms are attracted
to the technology, which makes for a more competitive service. As this model
is complicated, we solve for it numerically for representative parameter values.
In this sense, the paper follows in the tradition of Pakes and McGuire (1994)
and Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Our model exhibits two interesting equilibria. In the Þrst, consumers adopt
the technology that obtains a small early lead. Knowing this, Þrms also adopt
the technology with a small early lead, which in turn justiÞes the consumers
1A more detailed discussion of the industry can be found in Augereau, Greenstein and
Rysman (2003), and Rickard (1997a, 1997b, 1998).
2Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (2003) tests implications from this model in adoption
data on ISPs. See Rolhfs (2001) and the cites therein for many examples of adoption failure
in markets that exhibit network eﬀects.
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strategy. This tipping equilibrium is similar to previous research, such as
Arthur (1989), and exhibits relatively quick standardization.
However, there is a second equilibrium that exhibits features that largely
do not appear in the previous literature. In this equilibrium, a small group of
technology-loving consumers adopt the technologies early but a large group of
consumers delay their adoption until a critical mass of Þrms has picked one tech-
nology or the other. In this equilibrium, Þrms face a trade-oﬀ: if a Þrm adopts
the technology with a small early lead, it raises the likelihood that it will ul-
timately be serving the large market. If a Þrm adopts the other technology, it
faces less price competition in the short-run. When the short-run incentive to
diﬀerentiate outweighs the long-run incentive to coordinate, we observe Þrms
splitting between the two standards. Then, it is a best response for consumers
to delay their adoption decision. That is because observing a small early lead
does not indicate that a technology will become the market standard. Relat-
edly, the longer consumers delay their adoption decision, the more attractive
are the short-run beneÞts of diﬀerentiation to Þrms, so the strategies of de-
lay and diﬀerentiation are mutually reinforcing. This equilibrium exhibits later
standardization and is less eﬃcient.
We show that whether this delayed adoption equilibrium exists depends
on the relative strength of the network eﬀect and the level of competition. If the
network eﬀect for Þrms is large (captured by the size of the group of consumers
attracted to a popular standard), the incentive for Þrms to coordinate will be
large and we cannot support an equilibrium with delayed adoption. However, if
the market is very competitive (captured in this paper by a conjectural variations
parameter), Þrms will not be attracted to a standard with other Þrms even if
the size of the network eﬀect is large. In that case, the incentive to diﬀerentiate
dominates and an equilibrium with delayed adoption exists. One way for the
social planner to eliminate the delay is to eliminate one of the standards, in
which case the only equilibrium is for consumers to immediately adopt the
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remaining standard.
The early research on network eﬀects is optimistic about the chances for
relatively quick standardization.3 In Farell and Saloner (1986a), a stream of
consumers enter the market with rational expectations about the future and
therefore all choose the same (possibly ineﬃcient) standard. In Farell and Sa-
loner (1986b), sequential decision-making leads to widespread adoption of a
new technology, although they show that in a model with imperfect informa-
tion, there can be adoption failure or a failure to standardize. Arthur (1989)
is similar to Farell and Saloner (1986a) and shows that early adopters lead to
tipping towards one technology or the other. Katz and Shapiro (1986a) exhibits
a failure to standardize due to later generations of consumers valuing products
diﬀerently then early generations - a form of intertemporal heterogeneity.
The above models study direct network eﬀects in which no players has an
incentive to diﬀerentiate. More similar to our work is Chou and Shy (1990)
and Church and Gandal (1992) which study indirect network eﬀects similar to
those in this paper, where consumers value other consumers adopting their hard-
ware because it attracts more software providers. Church and Gandal (1992)
in particular show that it is possible to have the market adopt two technologies
when one would be preferable due to software providers incentive to diﬀerenti-
ate across standards. Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) highlight similar issues in
a more general setting. These models diﬀer from ours in that they study static
models in which all consumers adopt. We show in a dynamic setting that it is
possible for consumer to choose not to adopt, a particularly ineﬃcient result.
In summary, previous research considers models where the market chooses
between two options, either old versus new technology or technology A versus
technology B. Most previous research found tipping in markets with network
eﬀects. If they did not, they relied upon consumer heterogeneity (with the
exception of Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003) and still found that all consumers
3See Shy (2001) for an introduction to research on network eﬀects.
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adopt. We show that combining the choice of A versus B with the option to
not adopt creates a more complicated setting, one in which delay can arise
even when goods are homogenous and adoption would be immediate if only one
standard was available.
2 Model
This section presents a model of technology adoption under indirect network
eﬀects. There are two standards, A and B. There are n Þrms and a measure µ
of atomistic risk-neutral consumers. In practice, we consider only n = 3. There
are three types of consumers, types A, B and C with measures µA, µB and µC .
Type A consumers get higher utility from standard A and type B consumers
get higher utility from standard B. Type C consumers are indiﬀerent between
the standards and get less utility from the standards then A and B do from
their preferred standard. We can think a A and B types as technology lovers.
The game is in discrete time with an inÞnite horizon. Each period has two
stages. In the Þrst stage, Þrms and consumers choose simultaneously whether
or not to adopt one of the two standards. Firms and consumers cannot un-
adopt after choosing to adopt, but choosing not to adopt allows them to adopt
in a later period. Firms and consumers may not adopt both standards.4 In
the second stage, Þrms that have adopted set quantities to sell to consumers.
Consumers may buy only from Þrms that have adopted the same standard.
Otherwise, Þrms sell a homogenous product. Firms and consumers discount the
future at a common discount rate β. We search for a Markov Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium.
Consumers pay a hardware cost ph for adoption, common to both standards.
Consumer i who has adopted standard s observes per unit price pst in period
4Allowing for dual adoption makes the model more complicated although the results are
similar.
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t and chooses quantity qit. Each period, consumer i who has adopted s gets
utility:
usit = α+ qit −
q2it
2γsi
− pstqit.
Consumers with higher values of γsi derive higher utility from adoption. We
assume γAA = γ
B
B > γ
A
C = γ
B
C = γ
B
A = γ
A
B. Consumers that do not adopt or
that adopt when no Þrms have adopted get a payoﬀ of 0. Consumers solve the
Þrst-order condition:
1− qit
γsi
= pst ⇒ qit = γi(1− pst ) (1)
Total demand qst on standard s is the integral of qit over the set of consumers
who have adopted s:
qst = µ
s
t (1− pst )⇒ ps(qst ) = 1−
qst
µst
.
We refer to µst as the demand level in period t for standard s. In equilibrium,
we will see that µst can take on one of three values. For the parameter values
we analyze, type A consumers adopt A and B consumers adopt B in the Þrst
period, in which case µst = µ
sγss, s = A,B. It is also possible that C types split
between the two standards, so µst = µ
sγss + µ
CγsC/2. Finally, it may occur that
C types coordinate on a single standard s, in which case µst = µ
sγs + µCγsC .
Firms that adopt standard s pay a one-time Þxed fee of F + εsjt, where ε
s
jt
is the Þxed cost drawn by Þrm j in period t for standard s. While F is known
by all Þrms, εsjt is known only to Þrm j, although Þrms know that εjt is drawn
from the uniform distribution over [0, 1].5 Firms have a zero marginal cost of
production. We take the actions of the owner of the technology to be Þxed and
exogenous. That is, ph and F are exogenous parameters.
5Allowing cost shocks to be independent over time makes the analysis easier then if cost
shocks were corellated over time, which allows us to focus on the economic issues we are
interested in here. Levin and Peck (2003) consider an entry model in which Þrms draw a
single cost shock that stays constant for the entire game.
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We solve the production stage as a static Cournot game. While it may be
possible to Þnd equilibria where the production stage has dynamic features to
it, looking for Markov Perfect equilibria rules out most of the possibilities. Let
nst be the number of Þrms that have adopted s in period t. In the second stage
of period t, Þrm j that has adopted standard s solves:
max
qjt
πsjt = p
s
t (q
s
t )x
s
jt (2)
where πsjt is the ßow proÞt from production to Þrm j that has adopted s, and
xsjt is the quantity produced by Þrm j on s in period t so
Pnst
k=1 x
s
kt = q
s
t . In
equilibrium, ßow proÞt from production to a Þrm that has adopted is:
πsjt = π(n
s
t , µ
s
t ) =
µst
(nst + 1)
2
In addition, equilibrium price in period t is pst = 1/(n
s
t+1) so q
s
it = γin
s
t/(n
s
t+1).
Consumer utility can be computed accordingly. We denote equilibrium con-
sumer surplus to a consumer of type i in period t on s as ui(nst ). Note that
because the model implies that price is independent of the demand level µst ,
the consumers ßow utility does not depend on the adoption decision of other
consumers.
The focus of this model is on the adoption decision. In this model, the state
variables are the adoption decisions of Þrms and consumers in previous periods.
We denote the history of decisions by Þrms and consumers in period t with the
vector at.6 As Þrms and consumers make adoption decisions simultaneously,
they observe only at−1 at the time of their decision. Note that time t is not
a state variable as it is not pay-oﬀ relevant in the sense of a Markov perfect
equilibrium. The expected proÞt of adoption standard s in period t is:
Πs(at−1)− εsjt = E
" ∞X
τ=t
βτ−tπ(nsτ , µ
s
τ )
¯¯¯¯
¯at−1
#
− (F + εsjt)
The expectation is taken over the future adoption decision of consumers and
6DeÞne the vector a0 to be the vector denoting no adoption.
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Þrms nst and µ
s
t . A Þrm that waits receives:
Π0(at−1) = βE
£
max
¡
Π0(at),Π
A(at)− εAjt+1,ΠB(at)− εBjt+1
¢ |at−1¤
Firm j (that has not adopted) maximizes proÞt in period t by choosing dfjt ∈
{0, A,B} to maximize expected proÞt Πjt(dfjt,at−1) = {Π0(at−1) if dfjt = 0,
ΠA(at−1)− εAjt if dfjt = A, ΠB(at−1)− εBjt if dfjt = B}.
A consumer i that adopts s in period t receives:
V si (at−1) = E
" ∞X
τ=t
βτ−tui(nsτ )
¯¯¯¯
¯at−1
#
A consumer that waits receives:
V 0i (at−1) = βE
£
max(V 0i (at), V
A
i (at), V
B
i (at))|at−1
¤
Consumer i (that has not adopted) picks dcit ∈ {0, A,B} to maximize Vi(dcit,at−1) =
{V 0i (at−1) if dcit = 0, V Ai (at−1) if dcit = A, V Bi (at−1) if dcit = B}.
We will also be interested the case where there is only one standard. The set-
up is similar to the one above except that Þrms and consumers do not have the
option to adopt standard B. In this case, Þrms draw only εAjt. Firm j (that has
not adopted) maximizes proÞt in period t by choosing dfjt ∈ {0, A} to maximize
expected proÞt Πjt(d
f
jt,at−1) = {Π0(at−1) if dfjt = 0, ΠA(at−1) if dfjt = A}.
Similarly, consumer i (that has not adopted) picks dcit ∈ {0, A} to maximize
Vi(d
c
it,at−1) = {V 0i (at−1) if dcit = 0, V Ai (at−1) if dcit = A}. Otherwise, notation
is the same.
3 Computing Equilibrium
The adoption decision exhibits indirect network eﬀects in the sense that a con-
sumer may beneÞt from adoption by other consumers because it attracts more
suppliers to the consumers market, which lowers price. These models typically
have multiple equilibria in subgame perfect (or sequentially rational) equilibria.
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For instance, for any equilibrium adoption strategy, it may also be an equilib-
rium for all Þrms and consumers to wait three periods and then perform that
adoption strategy. Gale (1995) considers these diﬀerent types of equilibria in a
related framework. Focussing on Markov perfect equilibria removes waiting
scenarios, as the time period is not a payoﬀ relevant state variable.
Static games of network eﬀects typically also have equilibria where all agents
play do not adopt. However, a no adopt equilibrium is diﬃcult to sustain
in this dynamic setting. If the product is valuable to consumers and a Þrm did
adopt, consumers would want to take advantage in later periods by adopting.
So a Þrm would break a no adopt equilibrium, knowing it will induce the rest
of the market to follow. Gale (1995) shows in a related set-up that there will
always be adoption in Þnite time.7
Therefore, we have a stationary game in which strategies for Þrms df (at−1)
and strategies for consumers dci (at−1) are functions of previous adoption de-
cisions. We search for symmetric strategies. We search for equilibrium by
specifying consumer strategies dci (at−1) for i = A,B,C , then computing the
Þrms best response df (at−1) based on that consumer strategy, and then check-
ing if there is a deviation dc0i (at−1) that provides greater consumer surplus then
dci (at−1).
For consumers, we consider Þve possible strategies. We believe these strate-
gies span the set of possible equilibrium strategies. We call the Þrst strategy
immediate adoption. In this strategy, consumers adopt in the Þrst period, be-
fore they observe the decisions of Þrms. Under immediate adoption, we assume
consumers randomize between the two standards. Formally,
dci (at−1) = A with P = 0.5, B with P = 0.5, if n
A
t−1 = n
B
t−1
= s if nst−1 > n
−s
t−1.
7As stated above, we solve the production stage as a static game although it may be possible
to sustain strategies with dynamic implications by conditioning on adoption decisions.
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Also, we consider coordinated adoption, in which consumers immediately adopt
and coordinate on a single standard. For instance, if coordinated adoption is
focussed on A, then we have:
dci (at−1) = A if n
A
t−1 ≥ nBt−1 + 1
= B if nBt−1 = 3
Note that the second lines in the immediate adoption strategy and the coordi-
nated adoption strategy are relevant only for out-of-equilibrium events. In our
view, the coordinated adoption strategy is natural for the A and B types for
whom it would be obvious which standard to focus on, but immediate adoption
is more natural for C types who are indiﬀerent and have no coordinating de-
vice. We also consider the small lead strategy, where a consumer adopts the
Þrst standard to obtain a lead. Formally,
dci (at−1) = s if n
s
t−1 > n
−s
t−1
= 0 otherwise.
A fourth strategy is the established standard strategy, in which a consumer waits
until at least two Þrms have adopted a standard. Formally,
dci (at−1) = s if n
s
t−1 > 1
= 0 otherwise
In the established standard strategy, consumers that observe nAt = n
B
t = 1 wait
until the third Þrm adopts to make their choice. We might imagine it is better
to just adopt either standard at that point. This point leads us to our Þfth
strategy, the small lead/adopt strategy:
dci (at−1) = 0 if n
A
t−1 = n
B
t−1 = 0
= s if nst−1 = 1, n
−s
t−1 = 0
= A with P = 0.5, B with P = 0.5, if nAt−1 = n
B
t−1 = 1
= s if nst−1 > 1
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It would also be possible to create a coordinated version of small lead/adopt,
which is not important for our purposes.
For any given set of parameters and a conjectured set of consumer strategies,
we construct the Þrms strategies df (at−1). Because Þrms observe their own
draws of εsjt but not those of their competitors, Þrms strategies take the form of
cutoﬀs. Firm j in period t prefers to adopt standard s to waiting if εsjt < ε
s(at−1)
where εs(at−1) is deÞned by:
εs(at−1) = Πs(at−1)−Π0(at−1) (3)
Firm j in period t plays a strategy df (at−1) :
df (at−1) = s if εsjt < ε
s(at−1) and εsjt < Π
s(at−1)−Π−s(at−1) + ε−sjt s = A,B
0 otherwise
Figure 1 graphs this strategy in εs space. The line separating Adopt A and
Adopt B has slope 1 and intercept ΠB(at−1)−Π−A(at−1).
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In practice, we compute the cutoﬀs εs(at−1) numerically. We set up the
Þrms problem as a Bellmans equation. For a given value function, we iterate
best response cutoﬀs εs(at−1) until convergence. For a given set of cutoﬀs, we
use value function iteration to solve for the value function. By iterating between
solving for the cutoﬀs and value function, we solve for equilibrium cutoﬀs. The
appendix discusses this procedure in more detail.
4 Equilibrium
The features of the equilibrium depend crucially on parameter values. Trying
to characterize equilibria for the entire parameter set would be time consuming
and not very informative. Instead, we choose a set of representative parame-
ter values. In the next section, we perform comparative statics on important
parameters. We believe that this approach conveys the insights of the model
more eﬀectively then an exhaustive discussion of all possible parameter values.8
Consider the parameters n = 3, γH = 5, γL = 1, µH = 0.1, µL = 1, F = 0.5,
ph = 0.5 and β = 0.8. For these parameters, an individual A or B consumer
demands 5 times as much quantity as a C type, but total demand from C types
is still twice as much as from A (or B) types. Note that for these parameters,
π(2, µAγAA + µ
CγAC) > π(1, µ
AγAA). That is, the network eﬀect is large enough
such that a Þrm would prefer to be a duopolist on the popular standard then
be a monopolist on the unpopular standard.
For these parameter values, there are two equilibria that we discuss in this
section, and a third that we discuss in the next section as it is more interesting
in the context of discussing optimality. The Þrst equilibrium that we consider
is based on C types playing small lead. Consider the following set of consumer
strategies dci (at−1) :
8 In this sense, this paper is similar to Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and McGuire
(1994), and the literature that follows.
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1. Type A consumers play coordinated adoption on A.
2. Type B consumers play coordinated adoption on B.
3. Type C consumers play small lead.
Based on these consumer strategies, it is straightforward to compute cutoﬀs
εs(at−1). Table 1 presents adoption probabilities for Þrms as functions of nAt−1
and nBt−1, assuming C types have not yet adopted. For instance, if Firm 1 and
Firm 2 adopt A and B in the Þrst period, Firm 3 as a 27.1% chance of waiting
in period 2, and otherwise is equally likely to pick either standard. The crucial
line to observe is nAt−1 = 1, nBt−1 = 0 (note that nAt−1 = 0 and nBt−1 = 1 is
symmetric). After observing one Þrm adopt, there is 43.9% chance that each
remaining Þrm will adopt that standard and only a 26.2% chance that each Þrm
will adopt the other. That is, Þrms are attracted to the standard that has a
small lead. This feature both depends on and justiÞes the consumer strategy of
adopting the standard with a small lead. Given the strategies for Þrms indicated
in Table 1, a C type receives expected utility 0.504 from playing small lead, 0.494
from playing established standard, 0.487 from small lead/adopt and 0.283 from
immediate adoption.9 Type A and B consumers are also best oﬀ with their
strategies, expecting 3.42 from coordinated adoption and less then 3 from all
other strategies.10 Therefore, we have an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 A/B types playing coordinated adoption, C types playing small
lead, and Þrms adopting according to df (at−1), along with all agents believing
εsjt ∼ U [0, 1] is a Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
9Note that when considering deviations by atomistic consumers, immediate adoption is
equivalent to coordinated adoption for C types.
10We have chosen γAA and γ
B
B high enough that A and B types always adopt their preferred
standard in the Þrst period. The analysis would not be much diﬀerent if we simply assumed
that the game started with a group of consumers having already purchased each standard and
only analyzed the C types.
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Adoption Probabilities for Firms
Probability of Adoption
nAt−1, nBt−1 None A B
0,0 23.9% 38.1 38.1
1,0 29.9 43.9 26.2
2,0 33.5 22.8 43.7
1,1 27.1 36.5 36.5
Table 1: Consumers play small lead.
This equilibrium exhibits tipping. One standard obtains a small lead and
the market ßows towards that standard. This is the type of phenomena on
which much of the previous literature on network eﬀects has focussed.
However, our model exhibits a second equilibria that is diﬀerent from what
we have seen in previous work. Consider the game in which C types play estab-
lished standard instead of small lead. As before, A and B types play coordinated
adoption on their preferred standard. Given these decisions by consumers, Ta-
ble 2 presents adoption probabilities for Þrms. Again, focus on the case where
nAt−1 = 1 and n
B
t−1 = 0. In this case, it is more likely that the remaining Þrms
will adopt B, not A. Adopting A in this situation would ensure a Þrm that it
would serve the large market in the following period. But in the mean time,
it must suﬀer through a period of duopoly competition over a small market.
Instead, it prefers to go to the other standard, where it may be a monopolist.
Given these adoption probabilities by Þrms, we must check whether these
consumer strategies are best responses. Type A and B consumers receive a life-
time expected utility of 3.61 from immediate adoption. All of the other strategies
generate expected payoﬀs less then 3. Conversely, Type C consumers who play
immediate adoption receive expected utility of 0.12. Using established standard
generates 0.484, small lead receives .482 and small lead/adopt generates 0.464.
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Adoption Probabilities for Firms
Probability of Adoption
nAt−1, nBt−1 None A B
0,0 16.4% 41.8 41.8
1,0 22.4 31.4 46.2
2,0 26.2 25.9 47.9
1,1 21.7 39.1 39.1
Table 2: Consumers Play Established Standard
Therefore, we conclude that this set of strategies is an equilibrium.
Theorem 2 A/B types playing coordinated adoption, C types playing estab-
lished standard and Þrms playing df (at−1), along with all agents believing εsjt ∼
U [0, 1] is a Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
A market observer would see a small group of technology lovers adopt one
of the two standards immediately upon product introduction. A large group of
consumers would wait until one of the standards obtained widespread market
acceptance. The key feature to supporting this equilibrium is that Þrms prefer to
diﬀerentiate rather then coordinate, as exhibited by the nAt−1 = 1, n
B
t−1 = 0 row.
If a Þrm in this scenario were more likely to adopt A, then it would be diﬃcult
to support an equilibrium in which consumers wait for an established standard.
Upon observing adoption by one Þrm, consumers would know that remaining
Þrms are likely to choose that standard and then consumers themselves would
adopt. The key to supporting established standard is that when consumers
observe a standard achieve a small lead, it does not indicate that the standard
will gain widespread acceptance. Similarly, consumer delay is crucial to support
diﬀerentiation by Þrms. Because Þrms know consumers will delay their adoption,
the short run beneÞts of diﬀerentiation are more valuable relative to the long-run
beneÞts of coordination.
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5 Optimality
Ignoring the per period adoption shocks, the optimal conÞguration for these
parameter values would be to have all consumers and Þrms adopt in the Þrst
period, with two Þrms on the standard with the C types and one Þrm on the
other standard (see Thereom 7 in the appendix). With shocks, it can improve
total welfare for a Þrm to wait for a good shock to adopt. However, equilibria
in which consumers delay their adoption decisions are ineﬃcient in expectation
(see Theorem 8 in the appendix). A social planner that could not control the
individual decisions of agents in the market would look for actions that move
adoption forward in time.
We see two types of interventions that would be available to a realistic policy
maker. One intervention is for the social planner to announce that A or B was
the market standard. We can model this by assuming it moves the game from
a small lead or established standard equilibrium to one in which all players play
coordinated adoption. In fact, this consumer strategy can also be an equilibrium.
Theorem 3 A/B types playing coordinated adoption on their preferred stan-
dard, C types playing coordinated adoption on either standard, and Þrms play-
ing df (at−1), along with all agents believing εsjt ∼ U [0, 1] is a Markov Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
If all C types adopted A in the Þrst period, Þrms would be likely to adopt A
and consumers would not want to deviate. Note that it cannot be an equilibrium
for C types to play immediate adoption under these parameter values. It must
be that C types coordinate on a single standard in the Þrst period, so they are
all likely to be served by two or even three Þrms. In the absence of government
intervention, we Þnd it implausible that C types could manage to coordinate on
a single standard.11 However, it is certainly a believable result of a government
11We do not pursue formal equilibrium reÞnements that might restrict the number of equi-
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intervention.
A second and very similar intervention would be for the social planner to
eliminate one standard or the other, or to eliminate both and introduce a third
standard. This puts the market in the game with one standard, discussed at
the end of Section 2. In this game, none of the consumer strategies are an equi-
librium except immediate adoption (which is equivalent to coordinated adoption
when there is only one standard).
Theorem 4 In a game with one standard, all consumers adopting in the Þrst
period and Þrms playing df (at−1), along with all agents believing εsjt ∼ U [0, 1]
is the unique Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix
There is no reason for consumers to delay when they know that Þrms will
eventually adopt this standard.
6 Further Analysis
In the previous sections, we have analyzed the game for one set of parameter
values. In this section, we explore other sets of parameter values in order to learn
more about the model and verify that the intuition discussed above is accurate.
This paper is primarily interested in the phenomena of adoption delay and we
focus on the established standard equilibrium in this section.
The Þrst issue we study is the role of network eﬀects in determining the equi-
libria. Intuitively, it must be that for established standard to be an equilibrium,
libria in the model. However, note that established standard is less risky in a particular sense.
If a C type plays coordinated adoption or small lead and all other C types and Þrms play
according to established standard, the mistaken consumer may be stuck on the wrong stan-
dard forever. Conversely, the cost to a C type that plays established standard when all other
players play coordinated adoption or small lead is only that the mistaken consumer adopts
the correct standard one period too late. That is, established standard risk dominates small
lead and coordinated adoption in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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the size of the network eﬀect must not be too big. If the network eﬀect is large,
Þrms prefer coordination and it is no longer a best response for consumers to
delay. It is natural to think of the parameters γsi and µi as governing the size
of the network eﬀect. For instance, as γsC or µC rises, the importance of the
network becomes larger. That is, the impact of the decisions of the C types be-
comes larger so they attract more Þrms to their standard. If γsC or µC was very
large, Þrms would prefer coordinating with the C types to serving the A and
B types and the game would be as if there were homogenous consumers. Note
that comparative statics in µi are easier to interpret then in γ
s
i because µi does
not aﬀect any of the players objective functions directly, only their strategies.
We begin our study of the model by reducing µA = µB (which has the same
eﬀect as increasing µC). Setting µA = µB = 0.05 (instead of 0.1) increases
the attractiveness of selling to the C types relative to the A and B types.
Even if C types play established standard, Þrms no longer prefer diﬀerentiation.
Table 3 shows the best response probabilities for Þrms when consumers play
established standard. When observing nAt−1 = 1 and nBt−1 = 0, the remaining
Þrms still slightly prefer A to B. In this case, consumers would prefer to adopt
upon observing a single Þrm adopt because it is likely enough that they will
be served by more Þrms, so established standard cannot support an equilib-
rium.12 Therefore, as network eﬀects become more important, ineﬃcient delay
(associated with waiting for an established standard) disappears. For the values
µA = µB = 0.05, small lead can still support an equilibrium.
Theorem 5 For µA = µB = 0.05, C types playing established standard cannot
support an equilibrium although C types playing small lead can.
Proof. See appendix.
12The cut-oﬀ in µA/µB at which established standard can no longer support an equilib-
rium is higher then µA = µB = 0.05 and occurs at a point were Þrms still slightly prefer
diﬀerentiation to coordination.
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Adoption Probabilities for Firms
Probability of Adoption
nAt−1, nBt−1 None A B
0,0 35.4% 32.3 32.3
1,0 36.7 32.7 30.6
2,0 39.8 35.3 24.9
1,1 31.1 34.4 34.4
Table 3: Consumers play coordinated adoption, µA = µB = 0.05.
The feature that can undo the impact of large network eﬀects is the com-
petitiveness of the market. Intuitively, if Þrms face a very competitive market
after adopting, adopting the same standard as that of a competitor becomes
less attractive and we will observe Þrms diﬀerentiating across standards instead
of coordinating. We model this feature by introducing a conjectural variations
parameter. Following the literature on conjectural variations, we specify the
second-stage Þrst-order condition for Þrms that face competitors to be:
pst (Q
s
t ) +
∂pst (Q
s
t )
∂Qst
θ = 0
The parameter θ is a conjectural variations parameter. Setting θ = 1 implies
a Cournot game whereas setting θ = 0 implies a Bertrand game. Lowering
θ leads to a more competitive outcome, with lower prices and lower proÞts
for Þrms.13 For instance, consider θ = 0.5, µA = µB = 0.05 and consumers
playing established standard. In this case, equilibrium adoption probabilities
are in Table 4. Note that now, Þrms that observe nAt−1 = 1 and nBt−1 = 0 are
more likely to adopt B so the incentive to diﬀerentiate outweighs the incentive
13 Interpreting the parameter θ as a conjectural variation in the sense that the literature
originally meant has well-known problems. (for instance, see Lindh, 1992) For our purposes, we
think of it as just a convenient parameterization that indexes proÞtability and competitiveness
of the market.
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Adoption Probabilities for Firms
Probability of Adoption
nAt−1, nBt−1 None A B
0,0 37.4% 31.3 31.3
1,0 39.1 27.7 32.2
2,0 42.3 25.1 32.6
1,1 36.6 31.7 31.7
Table 4: Consumers play coordinated adoption, µA = µB = 0.05, θ = 0.5.
to coordinate. And also, playing established standard is a best response for
consumers so established standard is once again an equilibrium.
Theorem 6 For µA = µB = 0.05 and θ = 0.5, A and B types playing co-
ordinated adoption and C types playing established standard, and Þrms play-
ing df (at−1), along with all agents believing εsjt ∼ U [0, 1] is a Markov Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
We speculate that starting from a set of parameters for which established
standard can support an equilibrium, it is always the case that the incentive for
Þrms to coordinate can be increased via µi or γ
s
i such that established standard
can no longer be an equilibrium. However, we also conjecture that for any µi
or γsi , the competitiveness of the market can always be increased via θ such
that established standard can once again be part of an equilibrium. That is, the
possibility of adoption delay depends on the strength of the competing forces
of network eﬀects and competitiveness, driving the incentive to coordinate and
the incentive to diﬀerentiate.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic model of indirect network eﬀects. With Þrms
and consumers choosing between two diﬀerent standards and having the option
to delay adoption, we show for particular parameter values that an equilibrium
exists in which consumers delay their adoption until one of the standards reaches
a critical mass of Þrms. This delayed adoption equilibrium is less eﬃcient then
one in which Þrms and consumer adopt the standard that obtains a small early
lead or one in which they manage to coordinate on a standard in the Þrst period.
When there is only one standard, immediate adoption is the only equilibrium
strategy for consumers.
We believe that the original parameter values accurately reßect the market
for 56K modems. That is, when there were two standards, the market was in an
equilibrium based on established standard which entails signiÞcant delay. How-
ever, when the standard setting organization speciÞed a new standard, there was
eﬀectively only a single standard which led to immediate and widespread adop-
tion. We do not formally model the decisions of the sponsors of the technologies.
However, one could imagine that they hoped to introduce their products into a
market where consumers were playing small lead. Upon introducing the prod-
ucts, the sponsors realized that consumers and ISPs were adopting strategies
of delay and diﬀerentiation. The sponsors then turned to the standard setting
organization to eliminate the delay, even if it meant that the sponsors would
have to compete using the same standard.
A testable implication from this model is that when observing products that
fail to gain widespread acceptance due to a standards war, adopting Þrms should
be diﬀerentiating across the standards, as opposed to coordinating. Augereau,
Greenstein and Rysman (2003) provide empirical evidence that in the period
before the ITU became actively involved, adopting ISPs diﬀerentiated across
standards. That is, within local markets (which they treat as local calling
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areas), there were many more even splits between the two standards then would
be predicted by independent random choice.
The issues highlighted in this model may be important in other industries.
In particular, our model suggests that the competitiveness of the service market
may be an important determinant in adoption success. For example, in the
VCR industry, the Þrms in this model would be movie producers. One of many
possible reasons that the VCR market was successful in coordinating on a single
standard may be that movie producers choosing whether to produce for VHS or
Beta (or both) knew that popular movies would be proÞtable on either standard,
regardless of how many other prerecorded video tapes were available. This
contrasts with the ISP market where facing even a small number of competitors
could put ISPs in a very competitive situation, where it was diﬃcult to recoup
Þxed costs.
8 Appendix
Discussion of value function iteration: Let at be the 4×1 vector denoting the
state in period t. The Þrst 3 elements refer to the adoption decisions for Þrms 1
to 3 and may be equal to 1,2 or 3 denoting {have not adopted, have adopted A,
have adopted B}. The remaining element denotes the decision of C types and
may be equal to 1,2,3 or 4 denoting {have not adopted, have split between A
and B, have adopted A, have adopted B}. There are 108 possible states. Let
V (at−1) denote the value to Þrm 1 at the beginning of a period from being in
any one of those states, deÞned by the Þxed point:
V (at−1) = E[π(at)− F (at,at−1) + βV (at)|at−1]
where the expectation is taken both over the decisions of consumers and all
the Þrms, including Þrm 1. The function F (at, at−1) represents the cost of
adoption and is equal to E[F + εs1t|at−1] if Þrm 1 adopts (that is, a1t > 1
and a1t−1 = 1) and 0 otherwise. The expectation is taken with respect to the
probability density function generated by the cutoﬀs εs(at−1) and the decisions
of consumers, which are a deterministic function of at−1. We can write V (at)
and E[π(at) − F (at,at−1)|at−1] as 108×1 vectors. We start with a guess for
V (at) and iterate to obtain convergence. We can also compute the value of a
consumer at any given state:
Vi(at−1) = E[ui(at)− ph(at,at−1) + βVi(at)|at−1] i = A,B,C
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When we compute the value to a consumer from deviating from a proposed
equilibrium strategy, we augment at with an extra element which may take on 4
values and captures the decision made by the deviating consumer. In this case,
the state space has 432 states.
Proof of Theorem 3: A type A or B consumer that adopts their preferred
standard in the Þrst period expects utility of 5.26 whereas small lead/adopt ob-
tains 4.17, established standard obtains 4.04 and small lead obtains 4.06. Simi-
larly for C types, coordinated adoption obtains 0.65 whereas small lead/adopt,
established standard and small lead obtain 0.567, 0.557 and 0.558 respectively.
Proof of Theorem 4: Suppose all consumers adopt in the Þrst period. In this
case, each Þrm adopts in the Þrst period with probability 0.81. A Þrm adopts
upon observing 1 other adopter with probability 0.59 and upon observing 2
other adopters with probability 0.5. Type A/B consumers that adopt in the
Þrst period expect utility of 6.24, whereas waiting for one Þrm to adopt expects
5.11 and waiting for 2 adopters expects 5.03. Similarly for C types, adopting in
the Þrst period obtains 0.85 whereas waiting for one adopter obtains 0.70 and
waiting for two obtains 0.69.
Suppose C types adopt after observing 1 Þrm adopt. In this case, each Þrm
adopts in the Þrst period with probability 0.55. However, even in this scenario,
C types obtain expected utility of 0.75 from adopting in the Þrst period, 0.67
from waiting for 1 Þrm and 0.63 from waiting for 2 Þrms. Therefore, it is not
an equilibrium for C types to wait for 1 Þrm to adopt. Calculations are similar
for C types waiting for 2 Þrms. Therefore, C types adopting in the Þrst period
is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5: Suppose C types play established standard. Given
the best response strategies of Þrms (summarized in Table 3), C types obtain
0.472 from established standard and 0.484 from small lead, so this is not and
equilibrium.
Suppose C types play small lead. Given the best response strategies of Þrms,
C types obtain 0.515 from small lead, 0.497 from small lead/adopt, 0.494 from
established standard, and 0.252 from immediate adoption. Types A and B get
3.25 from immediate adoption and 2.59, 2.29 and 2.18 from small lead/adopt,
small lead and established standard respectively. Therefore, small lead is an
equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6: Given the best response strategies of Þrms (summarized
in Table 4), C types obtain 0.778 from established standard, 0.775 from small
lead, 0.734 from small lead/adopt, and 0.45 from immediate adopt. Types A
and B get 4.29 from immediate adoption and 3.55, 3.23 and 3.09 from small
lead/adopt, small lead and established standard respectively.
Theorem 7 The optimal conÞguration ignoring εsjt is to have all consumers
and Þrms adopt in the Þrst period, with tow Þrms on the standard with C types.
Proof. Assume 2 Þrms are on A. In this conÞguration, Þrms on A make πAjt =
0.167 and the Þrm on B makes πBjt = 0.125. Welfare to A types an individual
A types is uA(2) = 1.11, to B type is uB(1) = 0.625 and to a C type is
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uC(2) = 0.22. Total welfare is 2πAjt + π
B
jt + µAuA(2) + µBuB(1) + µCuC(2) =
0.854. An alternative conÞguration would be to have all Þrms and consumers
on the same standard (suppose A), which obtains πAjt = 0.1, uA(3) = 1.41 and
uB(3) = uC(3) = 0.28, for a total of 0.75. Because Þrms and consumers always
recieve positive payoﬀs from adoption as long as others adopt and receive zero
for not adopting, adoption should take place as early as possible.
Theorem 8 Equilibria in which consumers delay their adoption decision are
ineﬃcient in expectation.
Proof. In the equilibrium in which C type consumers play established standard,
expected proÞt for Þrms is 0.846, expected utility for A and B types is 3.41 and
expected utility for C types is 0.484, for a total expected welfare of 3.705. In
the equilibrium in which C type consumers play small lead, expected proÞt for
Þrms is 0.849, expected utility for A and B types is 3.42 and expected utility
for C types is 0.504, for a total expected welfare of 3.734. In the equilibrium
in which C type consumers play coordinated adoption, expected proÞt for Þrms
is 0.828, expected utility for A and B types is 5.26 and expected utility for C
types is 0.652, for a total expected welfare of 4.189.
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